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NOTES
BILLS AND NOTES- NEGOTIABILITY OF NOTE
LACKING ENDORSEMENT OF SPECIAL ENDORSEE
Defendant and his son executed a promissory note made
payable to "themselves," endorsed the note in blank and deliv-
ered it to plaintiff to represent the balance due on an auto-
mobile purchased by the son. Plaintiff negotiated the note to
General Motors Acceptance Corporation by special endorsement.
GMAC subsequently returned the note to plaintiff without en-
dorsement, and plaintiff obtained judgment against the son.1
Enforcement of the judgment left a deficiency remaining, and
plaintiff sought to collect the deficiency from defendant. De-
fendant urged, among other defenses, that plaintiff had no
interest in the note, since it had not been endorsed by GMAC
when plaintiff reacquired it. The district court rendered judg-
ment for the plaintiff, and defendant appealed. The First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeal affirmed. Held, endorsement in blank of a
note made payable to the order of the maker converts the note
to bearer paper, and if the note is later specially endorsed, en-
dorsement by the special endorsee is not necessary for further
negotiation, mere delivery being sufficient to constitute negotia-
tion of bearer paper. Polk Chevrolet, Inc. v. Viccro, 162 So. 2d
761 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
At common law an instrument originally made payable to
bearer could not be converted to order paper by special endorse-
ment.2 Despite the lack of endorsement by the special endorsee,
such a note would be negotiable by delivery.3 Smith v. Clarke4
established the same rule for a note originally made payable
to order but converted to bearer paper by the endorsement in
blank and later specially endorsed. Thus, no matter how an
instrument became bearer paper, it always remained bearer
1. While GMAC was still holding the note, the son executed another note,
payable to GMAC, the primary purpose of which was to rearrange the payments
under the first note. The defendant was not a party to the second note, but it
contained a clause indicating that the first note, except the installment provision,
was to remain in force. The court found that no novation was accomplished, and
that defendant's obligation as a co-maker on the first note remained in force.
162 So. 2d at 765.
2. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 63 (2d ed. 1961).
3. Ibid.
4. Peake 295, 170 Eng. Rep. 162 (1794).
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paper at common law. The Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law (NIL) 5 clearly codified the common law rule concerning
notes originally made payable to bearer. Under NIL section
40, such a note, even if specially endorsed, may be negotiated
by mere delivery, despite the lack of an endorsement by the
special endorsee.6 It is not clear, however, whether section 40
should be applied to notes originally made payable to order,
converted to bearer paper by an endorsement in blank, and
then specially endorsed. 7 Under NIL section 9 (5), an instru-
ment is payable to bearer "when the only or last endorsement
is an endorsement in blank." Under NIL section 34, such an
instrument is negotiable by delivery. However, section 34 also
requires that an instrument which is specially endorsed be en-
dorsed by the special endorsee before it can be negotiated. Under
these sections it seems that the blank endorsement would con-
trol only if it is "the only or last endorsement," and it there-
fore appears that the rule of Smith v. Clarke has been changed
by the NIL insofar as it affects notes originally made payable
to order. There is, however, an apparent conflict in the pro-
visions of the NIL, since section 40 states that "when an instru-
ment, payable to bearer, is endorsed specially, it may neverthe-
less be further negotiated by delivery." If NIL section 40 is
applied to all bearer paper, including notes which are bearer
paper due to an endorsement in blank, it conflicts with NIL
sections 9 (5) and 34.8 It may be argued that section 40 should
apply in all cases, since NIL section 48 provides that a holder
may at any time strike out any endorsement not necessary to
his title. It seems to follow that a person acquiring a note en-
dorsed in blank and subsequently specially endorsed could simply
strike out the special endorsement and negotiate the note by
delivery. This argument avoids an essential issue, however, since
it leaves unanswered the question whether a possessor of a note
unendorsed by the special endorsee is actually a "holder" who
5. The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was adopted in Louisiana by
Act 64 of 1904, and now appears in title 7 of the Revised Statutes. The section
numbers of the Louisiana enactment correspond to the numbering of the uniform
act, and this Note will refer only to the uniform enactment.
6. NIL § 40 provides: "Where an instrument, payable to bearer, is endorsed
specially, it may nevertheless be further negotiated by delivery; but the person
endorsing specially is liable as endorser to only such holders as make title through
his endorsement." See also BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 63 (2d ed. 1961).
7. Most authorities take the position that § 40 does not apply in this situation.
See, e.g., BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 64 (2d ed. 1961).
8. See Parker v. Roberts, 243 Mass. 174, 137 N.E. 295 (1922), in which the
court relied upon NIL § 40, ignoring §§ 34 and 9(5).
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could invoke the advantages of section 48.1 The conflict between
section 40 and sections 34 and 9 (5) is more apparent than real,
however, if section 40 is applied only to paper originally bearer
paper on its face, and sections 34 and 9 (5) are applied only to
paper which is originally made payable to order. If the scope
of the sections is so limited, paper which was originally payable
to bearer will always remain bearer paper, but the nature of
paper originally made payable to order may be changed by en-
dorsement, with the requirements for negotiation depending on
the last endorsement. It should be noted that the possible con-
flict under the NIL is completely resolved by the Uniform Com-
mercial Code,10 which provides that the last endorsement controls
the character of all paper, whether it was originally made pay-
able to order or to bearer. The more intricate problem of a
specially endorsed note which is reacquired by the endorser can
easily be solved by considering NIL sections 50 and 121. Under
section 50, when an instrument is negotiated back to a prior
party, the latter may reissue and further negotiate the note.
Under section 121, an endorser who pays the instrument is en-
titled to possession of it and is "remitted to his former rights."
This rule would apply even to an instrument originally made
payable to order and specially endorsed by every holder. En-
dorsement by subsequent endorsees would not be necessary for
negotiation by a holder who reacquires the note.
In determining that the plaintiff had an interest in the note
in the instant case, the court based its decision on NIL sections
40 and 48, ignoring section 34. The court reasoned that endorse-
ment in blank by the defendant made the note bearer paper,
negotiable without the endorsement of the subsequent endorsee
under section 40. It thus followed that mere delivery would be
sufficient to constitute negotiation. Consequently, under section
48, plaintiff could strike out the special endorsement and sue
9. Prior to the adoption of the NIL one Louisiana court took the position
that an endorser who regained possession of a note was a "holder." See Squier
v. Stockton, 5 La. Ann. 120 (1850), in which a note made payable to the maker
was specially endorsed and then reacquired by the maker without the endorse-
ment of the special endorsee. The court held that the maker could strike out the
special endorsement and negotiate the note.
See also NIL § 191, which defines "holder" as a payee or endorsee of a note
in his possession, or the bearer of such a note, and "bearer" as the person in
possession of a note payable to bearer. Reading these two definitions together
would require that before a person could claim the advantage of § 48, he would
have to show either that the instrument in his possession was bearer paper, or
that it bore the required endorsements.
10. UNIFORM COMMRCIAL CODE § 3-204.
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on the note. By basing its decision on section 40, the court kept
the Louisiana rule in conformity with the Louisiana decisions
prior to the adoption of the NIL," but missed an opportunity to
clarify the law. If the suggested solution to the conflict between
NIL sections 40 and 34 is sound, and if the only issue had been
the necessity of a special endorsee's endorsement, defendant was
correct in arguing that GMAC's endorsement was necessary for
plaintiff to be able to sue on the note since the note was origin-
ally order paper, converted into bearer paper by an endorse-
ment in blank, and subsequently specially endorsed. It is sub-
mitted that sections 34 and 9 (5) of the NIL should have been ap-
plied, rather than sections 40 and 48, with the result that GMAC's
endorsement was necessary for negotiation of the note. The
equitable result reached in the instant case could have been
obtained by another method, however, and all conflict under
the NIL could have been avoided. Since the plaintiff in the
instant case reacquired the specially endorsed instrument, he
would be "remitted to his former rights" under section 121 of
the NIL. Thus, by applying section 48, he is entitled to strike
out his endorsement and all subsequent ones, and sue on the
note in his former right as one to whom the note was originally
issued.'2
A. L. Wright II
CIVIL PROCEDURE- COMPROMISE WITH JOINT TORTFEASOR -
EFFECT ON THIRD PARTY DEMAND
Plaintiff, a guest passenger, was injured in an automobile
collision allegedly caused by the concurrent negligence of his
host driver and the employee-driver of the other vehicle. Plain-
tiff sued his host's insurer and the owner of the other vehicle
11. E.g., Wood v. Tyson, 13 La. Ann. 104 (1858) ; Squier v. Stockton, 5 La.
Ann. 120 (1850). The court, however, did not purport to rely on these decisions.
Query: is there any inference to be drawn from the fact that Louisiana adopted
the NIL subsequent to these decisions? If anything, adoption would seem to
indicate an intent to deviate from these decisions rather than intent to codify
them.
12. Under the provisions of NIL § 184 and § 191, a note made payable to
the order of the maker is not issued until it is endorsed by the maker and deliv-
ered to a party who takes it as a holder. NIL § 191 provides that "'Issue' means
the first delivery of the instrument, complete in form, to a person who takes it
as a holder," and under NIL § 184, "a note drawn to the maker's own order . . .
is not complete until endorsed by him."
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